As much as I would instinctively agree with de Bary, I do not see how his argument would persuade other people around the world to include the Analects in their school curricula. After all, every society on earth has its culture heroes, recent as well as ancient, with strong personalities, "who achieved a measure of self-fulfillment in difficult circumstances. " In a sense, then, de Bary does not solve but instead simply highlights the problem facing all contributors to the volume. They need to convince readers not only that Confucian ideas and institutions are interesting and valuable, but also that they are preferable to other alternatives or, in other words, more "feasible and desirable" than the alternatives, including modern or Western ones. The various contributors are painfully aware of this fact and exert their best efforts to show how Confucian prescriptions for today's ills are better than others.
Moreover, some contributors embrace de Bary's advice that, in developing Confucian-based prescriptions for today's ills, we stay focused on ways in which East Asian peoples previously implemented Confucian ideas and ideals in actual historical practices and institutions. Other contributors are somewhat culpable of creating an "invented tradition" out of elements of "Confucianism" as they see it.
To begin, in "Constitutionalism, Confucian Civic Virtue, and Ritual Propriety, " Hahm Chaihark provides an excellent survey of relevant political theory and of the role of ritual in a traditional Confucian state. He convincingly establishes the importance of political culture and individual civic education for modern constitutional states. His suggestion for improving upon the current state of affairs is to enhance it with the use of li, norms of ritual propriety. With regard to institutions, he suggests a revival of Royal Lectures, the Censorate, and Court Historians. Although he hints at the need for an aristocracy of everyone-in contrast to the traditional aristocratic elite-he fails to face the thorny issue of the elitist nature of the norms of ritual propriety. He also fails to convince readers that we must revive premodern institutions in order to control authoritarian efforts that undermine constitutional arrangements, such as the balance of powers between branches of government. In order to argue convincingly that such a revival would be feasible and desirable, he would need to show that the three institutions to be revived could counter authoritarian excesses better than those available to modern societies, such as opposition parties, the courts, and a free press. As it is, his recommendation seems little more than quaint and impractical.
In "The Challenge of Accountability, " Jongryn Mo focuses more narrowly on the traditional institution of the Censorate, especially as it existed during the Chosŏn dynasty , and makes specific and limited suggestions about how to incorporate elements of it into contemporary governance. He begins by introducing modern theories on accountability as his analytical tools.
He introduces accountability theory that distinguishes between vertical and horizontal accountability (p. 57). In using it, he informs us that the main mechanism for vertical accountability in modern democracies, elections, was lacking in Chosǒn Korea, although there was a degree of commitment to the Confucian idea of "people-based politics" (minbon jǒngchi) (p. 63). Regarding horizontal accountability, he provides evidence that the institutions of the Chosǒn Censorate were quite modern. Mechanisms were in place to ensure the independence of accounting agents (censors). There were multiple accounting (censoring) agencies, and their jurisdictions overlapped. The three censoring agencies were independent of one another as well as of the personnel directors in the ministry of personnel who appointed censors. Most interesting, many of those making appointments and those appointed to terms as censors were relatively young officials (pp. 60-62) . In this regard, one of Mo's conclusions is quite remarkable and runs against the grain of our stereotypical views of the gerontocratic nature of Confucian states. He remarks: "Promising young officials in the Censorsate and the Ministry of Personnel wielded an amount of real independent power that is unthinkable in contemporary Korean bureaucracy" (p. 67).
Mo makes this comment in connection with three suggestions he has for introducing elements of the premodern censorsate into a contemporary political system (p. 67). His first suggestion involves a "direct approach" in which we appoint modern-day censors in the office of the president. With this suggestion, he is acknowledging that censors would provide criticism that, nowadays, is meant to come from political parties and the media. He states that internal censors' criticism may, nonetheless, have value because of the high level of distrust between political parties, and between the government and the media. Under "indirect approaches, " he recommends that the idea of censorial independence be applied in new ways to make Korea's criminal prosecution system politically independent. His second recommendation is the one involving empowerment of young officials, finding ways for them "to become internal agents of change within the bureaucracy" (p. 67).
Because of Mo's approach, which is historically grounded and detail-oriented, leading to appropriately limited recommendations, his contribution is actually a good example of arguing for "feasible and desirable Confucian policies and institutions. " Wang Jun Tao, in "Confucian Democrats in Chinese History, " aims to defend the thesis that Confucianism is not inherently incompatible with democracy (p. 69). Wang begins by explaining that there is no "real" Confucianism because it is something that is always changing and is viewed differently by different people. One might take this to mean that it is not inherently incompatible with anything. On this note, Wang begins to explain his rather facile methodology. He explains that his method of proof will be that, if one can show that there are modern historical figures who have defended Confucianism and have struggled for democracy, then Confucianism and democracy are compatible (p. 71). After explaining his method, he provides us with a very predictable list of modern Chinese intellectuals from Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao to Mou Zongsan and Chen Ziming. This list is supposed to convince us that Confucianism and democracy are not inherently incompatible.
In "Mutual Help and Democracy in Korea, " Chang Yun-shik says, "[W]e need to find out under what conditions they [elements in Asian values] cease to be antagonis-tic to this new political ideal and system [democracy] . " In this effort, he says he will focus on "one specific Confucian ethic, the ethic of mutual help" (p. 91). He begins by discussing the concept of community compact (Hyangyak). Identifying Lu Dajun and Zhu Xi as originators of the concept, he focuses on later East Asian Confucians as its admirers and developers. In particular, he covers the Chungchong ruler of the Chosǒn dynasty. This ruler's main idea was to teach the local populace the Confucian ethic and to supplement the family moral codes with communal ethics as conceived by Zhu Xi.
His effort built on existing sources of mutual help ethics: agricultural labor-sharing among families of peasants and kinship-based mutual aid among families of the gentry.
The Hyangyak movement combined the two sources while giving clear status superiority to gentry over peasants. The two groups cooperated for their mutual advantage in some ways, but to the disadvantage (exploitation) of peasants in other ways.
Against this historical background, Chang discusses how personalism that was built into the historical system continues in today's rural communities and even influences the formation of mutual help groups in modern urban communities. In the modern context, groups are more voluntary, geographically spread out, and diffuse. Nonetheless, mutual aid and obligation networks remain central, and social capital derived through them is very important for individual success. In turning to the issue of personalist ethics and democracy, Chang points out that Korea has accepted democracy as a principle of legitimacy but in a more personalist than narrowly "individualist" context. In his words:
[T]he personalist, when he becomes a democrat, will no doubt concur with his individualist counterpart that each citizen is an independent being with a series of rights conferred by the constitution, that he is free to exercise these rights by himself, and that the government should ensure that these individual rights of the citizen are not violated by others. But personalist democrats are not likely to ignore one another or make their political decisions on their own. They will encourage consultation with or advice seeking from others in making decisions on political matters, and they will share information and lend moral support. " (p. 121) Advantages of personalist democracy may include being able to avoid the tendency in individualist democracies for people to exclude themselves from politics.
They may also include avoidance of dependence on legalism by focusing, instead, on persons. Personalists, Chang says, turn to law only as a last resort (p. 122).
Although he acknowledges that personalist networks have historically been narrow, he is optimistic about the possibility of personal or affective networks being extended to strangers once personalists are committed to democratic ideals.
In "A Pragmatist Understanding of Confucian Democracy, " David Hall and
Roger Ames express pessimism about the rapid development of democracy in East Asian societies. However, they do so for reasons other than those held by people who are waiting for East Asians to embrace the rationalizing discourse of human rights, the rule of law, and so forth. In their words, "[U]nquestionably, the importation of Western democratic institutions by non-Western countries has required the acceptance of economic and cultural forces that have little to do with democracy per se . . . [including] rationalized social, economic, and technological elements" (p. 124). In their view, the sensibilities of "Confucian democracy" are threatened by legal formalism, the concept of the autonomous individual, a qualitative concept of equality, an economic system featuring quantitative considerations of merit, a preoccupation with formal institutions, and insistence upon individual rights to the detriment of social responsibilities (p. 125).
In order to overcome obstacles to Confucian democracy, Hall and Ames offer American pragmatism as a perspective for seeing the practical dynamics of Confucianism and democracy. In particular, they find most useful John Dewey's ability to see democracy in social and cultural terms-the habits of everyday liferather than in narrowly political terms. From the perspective of American pragmatism, they argue, we can see Confucian and democratic tendencies as mutually accessible cultural elements, not as mutually exclusive political ideologies. To show how this is so, they explore the compatibility of Dewey and Confucius in a manner that they have done in other works. The Deweyan emphasis on aesthetic experience, education as habit formation, the power and value of tradition as shared past, and so forth are seen as being Confucian in important ways.
They stress the tension between the world as imagined by Confucius and
Dewey, on the one hand, and that as predicted by Max Weber's rationalization thesis, on the other hand. By siding with the former two thinkers, rather than accepting the inevitability of rationalization, they imagine that Confucian societies can become democratic without giving up their traditions and allowing themselves to suffer incarceration within Weber's iron cage. They see hope, for example, in the kind of local initiatives stressed by political scientist Kate Zhou in How the Farmers Changed China: Power of the People (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) . According to Hall and Ames, "[H]er project is entirely consistent with our suggestion that Confucian democracy as it emerges will have more to do with the degree of success that local groups have in slowly and quietly enchanting the routine habits of the day than with any dramatic pronouncements of central authority" (p. 160).
While it is easy to share skepticism with the idea that central authority in China will bring democracy to the people, it is difficult to understand how Confucianism will be the basis for bottom-up efforts at democratization. If one wants to look at habits of the common people, it might make more sense to consider ideals and practices found in Buddhism, Taoism, and Chinese popular religion. Obviously, this would be too much for scholars as committed to the myth of Confucian China as are Hall and Ames (see, for example, comments on p. 137). One must also question what Hall and Ames present as a contrast between East Asia and "the West, " which often amounts to a contrast between traditional and modern, as acknowledged in their own discussion of Thomas Jefferson (p. 145). Long before China came under the influence of the West, it was already being transformed from an agriculturally based society with characteristically "traditional" values to a commerce-based society moving in the direction of what we now call modernity. During the early modern transformation of China, Confucianism did little to forestall the move away from the values of agricultural society, but rather found ways to adjust itself to the new commerce-based mentality while continuing its association with centralized authority. It is, therefore, hard to imagine that it will now be able to forestall the much more powerful forces of not only central authority but also modern capitalism. Thus, in my view, we should applaud the efforts of Hall and Ames to seek ways to counter the spread of deleterious elements of modern capitalism to those areas of the world seeking to democratize. However, giving Confucianism a major role in this may be called "desirable" but not "feasible. "
In "The Case for Moral Education, " Geir Helgesen presents a debate between two camps. On one side are those, such as Anthony Giddens, who see globalization as inevitable and, therefore, propose ways to ameliorate its negative effects. On the other side are those, such as Helgesen himself, who argue that globalization as such can be countered by supporting and reforming historical traditions, such as Confucianism.
Interestingly, he also indicates that "invented traditions" are part of the lamentable situation of inevitable globalization envisioned by Giddens and his ilk. This involves "the invention of 'traditions, ' constructed traditions used to rationalize changes in behavior or any behavior at all. Such 'traditions' are no longer linked to space or time and are absolutely not products of history" (p. 166). Ironically, the Confucian tradition as presented by Helgesen and some others in this book clearly qualifies as an invented tradition that has yet to manifest itself on the stage of actual history.
Hegelsen informs us that the Korean educational establishment is involved in its own debate, one which will affect the future of Confucian moral education. Those now in the ascendancy argue for promoting values of liberal citizenry that will help Korea further democratize and adjust to changes wrought by globalization. Those who used to have the upper hand promoted moral education with Confucian values.
Their type of moral education fell into disfavor because of its erstwhile association with authoritarian governments. Helgesen argues against those who see the inevitability of globalization defined as increasing acceptance of political and economic systems of Western origin. He sees a strong need to preserve local traditions as part of the all-important task of building a democratic social and political culture, not simply developing democratic institutions. In Korea, this would mean building a social and political culture that is "Confucian, " since this term defines the basic historical social values there. Nonetheless, Helgesen is aware of the downside of continuing the elitist spread of patriarchal, traditionally Korean moral education. Therefore, he advocates a "re-revolutionizing" promotion of the feminine side of the Confucian teaching in which the mother-child dyad would be the point of departure. Since Confucian moral education built on such a foundation is not what existed historically, this may be just the kind of "invented tradition" that mother-loving cosmopolitans everywhere in the world would embrace. If so, Helgesen's proposal would just be further evidence of the inevitability of globalization as described by Giddens.
Gilbert Rozman contributes a chapter titled "Center-Local Relations: Can Confucianism Boost Decentralization and Regionalism?" Rozman spends more time discussing decentralization than regionalism since he seems to take for granted that Confucianism is East Asia's shared value system. Of course, in taking this for granted, Rozman does his own part in making "Confucianism" a pan-East Asian regional ideology with qualities conducive to modernization, decentralization, and other fortuitous trends. Regarding decentralization, he claims that there is a split between those who equate Confucian tradition with centralization and related values, such as "group orientation, community responsibility, and nationalism, " and those who "are struggling to reaffirm the decentralized roots of the tradition" (p. 181).
While it is unclear, who, beyond Rozman, is now involved in this struggle, he provides us with an excellent discussion of historical evidence of resources in the Confucian tradition on the basis of which to make an argument for decentralized government. However, there are clearly points at which he seems to overreach. For example, he begins his discussion with the claim that "Confucius had insisted that moral officials well educated in managing society through rituals and family solidarity could reduce the costs of administration" (p. 184). Presumably unable to cite any saying from the Master on this topic, he cites as evidence T. R. Reid's Confucius Lives Next Door (New York: Random House, 1999). In continuing his discussion, Rozman shows that the debate over centralized administration was, indeed, an important one in traditional China, with Confucians sometimes making important arguments on the side of decentralization. They ended up with "a recipe for decentralization without denying an important state role" (p. 185). While this recipe was never purely Confucian, it certainly played a strong role in premodern East Asian political life. What benefits can accrue from a return to this recipe today?
After surveying the difficulties faced by China and Japan in recent times, Rozman makes the following summative comment:
Neither China nor Japan has yet found a cultural rationale for invigorating decentralization. By rediscovering the Confucian meaning of localism as a balance to centralism, each may find that starting point . . . By combining the themes of Confucianism as a venerable tradition of decentralization and Confucianism as a search for values drawing a new region together, East Asian nations would be sending a message of cooperation to each other. They would be asserting to the rest of the world that they have something in common besides geography and would shape the global agenda not through suspect Asian values but through a decentralized balance of localism, nationalism, regionalism, and globalism capable of earning international respect. (p. 199) This is a lot to expect from "a recipe for decentralization without denying an important state role. " Sounding more like an elixir of immortality, I feel obliged to categorize it as another "desirable" yet not "feasible" example of "Confucianism for the modern world. " Lew Seok-Choon, Chang Mi-Hye, and Kim Tae-Eun offer us "Affective Networks and Modernity: The Case of Korea. " The authors aim to suggest "the relationship between affective networks and modernity is more than one of the functional equivalents of a passing variety" (p. 217). Their effort constitutes one of the most successful in this volume, because of the evidence they offer both for the historical existence of certain Confucian cultural factors and for their description of the situation today. As the authors point out, the cultural factors involved were actually Neo-Confucian as a result of sociopolitical developments, inspired by the Chosǒn dynasty's adoption of Zhu Xi's teachings (pp. 213-216) . They show that these cultural factors are alive and well in Korea today in three forms: familial, school-based, and a regional (p. 203). They also show that there is a genuine debate in Korean society, and among scholars studying it, about the value of affective networks. In a more prescriptive vein, they want to show that there is a stronger than heretofore believed case for what they call the minority view: that affective networks are not simply a remnant of the past that, at best, helped Korea at the "development state" stage of democratization and industrialization.
The authors acknowledge the downside of traditional and affective networks (especially see pp. 206 and 212), yet they point out that these are not unique to Korean affective networks, and that Western-style contractual networks of individuals (political parties, labor unions, and so forth) also have problems. For example, both are equally subject to the "transactional costs" of such factors as cronyism and corruption. As they indicate, the cultural factors in question have always been a double-edged sword. The Confucian worldview that has supported the affective networks-especially as modeled on the family-has also included a strong tendency to condemn cronyism and corruption. Today's affective networks, they wish to stress, have fluid boundaries, and Koreans tend to join as many as possible. Problems of access and exclusivism can be less than in some Westernstyle unions and political parties. Moreover, considering their demonstrated staying power, affective networks will continue to belong to the modernization process in Korea. The authors present a good case for believing that they will transform, not be eradicated by, further modernization.
In "Confucian Constraints on Property Rights, " Daniel A. Bell argues that Confucian views on property lie in between views that completely disavow state intervention in private ownership and those that advocate extensive public ownership. To articulate a Confucian contribution to the modern debate, Bell begins by listing the criteria he will use to select relevant Confucian values. He lists five criteria. First, the values in question must be relevant to the topic of property rights.
Second, the values must have been espoused by the founding figures Confucius and
Mencius. Third, they must not have been repudiated by contemporary Confucian intellectuals. Fourth, they must in some way differ from Western liberalism, so as to be "Confucian norms [that] have independent value" (p. 222). Finally, they must be values that still inform East Asian societies. On this basis, Bell identifies two key values: an emphasis on basic material welfare and a stress on care for needy family members. It is not hard for Bell to demonstrate that these values have historical grounds as well as currency in East Asia today. Regarding the first, he states, "From a Confucian standpoint, the government's first priority is to secure the basic means of subsistence of the people, and this obligation has priority over civil and political rights in cases of conflict" (p. 234). With regard to the second, he points out that it "entails granting property rights to families rather than individuals" and that for societies that "worry about the corrosive effects of liberal individualism on family life, they might well seek inspiration from the Confucian value of care for needy family members and its practical consequences" (p. 235). Of course, Bell does not indicate which modernizing societies actually need Confucian inspiration because they lack the idea of caring for needy family members or, for that matter, of securing the basic means of subsistence of the people. I suspect he would have a hard time finding any that need to import these values from outside.
Joseph Chan provides the piece "Giving Priority to the Worst Off: A Confucian Perspective on Social Welfare. " As he indicates, traditional Confucian political thought included the idea that a key task of government was to relieve people's suffering. Nonetheless, he explains, in the Confucian case, the government did its task by providing conditions for the people to enrich themselves, not by establishing a welfare state. In part, this meant that family and community should be enabled to help relieve suffering, with government action as a last resort. Fast-forwarding to modern times, a Confucian-influenced state would need to observe three principles: (1) welfare should come first through familial and social networks, (2) entitlements sanctioned by a government should only constitute "fallback support, " and (3) welfare should not encourage people to shirk responsibility to care for family members (pp. 248-249). To implement these principles, Chan proposes a system of voluntary "tax" payments to welfare programs in which someone believes and through which one can help those for whom one specifically cares. The government should provide the information people need to make wise choices and should take action, as needed, to ensure a somewhat even distribution of revenues among various welfare programs.
Realistically, Chan admits, this system could only partially replace a statefunded welfare system and may best be used to supplement the latter. He points to the success of the methods used by the American United Way organization in soliciting and distributing welfare dollars to a wide range of programs. Unfortunately, he does not explain why governments will do a better job of soliciting and distributing donations than private charity organizations, such as United Way. If we are not sure they will, why not just leave this job in private hands? He is also oddly silent on failed American efforts to replace tax-supported government welfare with voluntary contributions, such as George H. W. Bush's now infamous "thousand points of light. "
It seems naïve to believe that a government's pronouncements and guidance would make people open their wallets with joy, even if the government was "Confucian. " Albert H. Y. Chen provides the first of several law-related essays with "Mediation, Litigation, and Justice: Confucian Reflections in a Modern Society. " Elaborating on the oft-noted Confucian preference for mediation over litigation, he summarizes relevant principles discussed in classical texts. Then, he goes on to present a fascinating list of legendary and historical figures idolized for their mediation skills, beginning with Emperor Shun and ending with two Qing dynasty magistrates (pp. 263-266) .
Finally, he surveys the role of later Confucian philosophical commentary in further reinforcing Chinese reasons for preferring mediation over litigation. After this excellent summary, he provides a well-articulated, eight-point summary of liberal critiques of the use of mediation as a (poor) substitute for litigation (pp. 270-274) . Turning to contemporary developments, he looks at the development outside China of "alternative dispute resolution" (ADR) and shows how justifications for it dovetail nicely with traditional Confucian views on the virtues of mediation. He concludes that we should see mediation not as a kind of second-class justice, but rather as a form of justice that has distinct advantages in certain circumstances, and that this view is perhaps better defended from the position of Confucian thought on mediation than from that of modern ADR thinking (pp. 280-281) . As for his proposals, he argues, first, that we should have mediation available as an alternative to litigation, but not a substitute for it; second, that mediation must be noncoercive, which means offered in an environment where one can still take other legal action; third, that we must address the problem of "power imbalance" (in which one party in mediation has enough social-political might to dictate the outcome); and, finally, that mediation must be applied only to suitable cases, such as family matters, rather than to all legal cases. He concludes that, in light of its cultural background, modern Chinese society should and will allow a larger role for mediation than in many other modern societies, even though its ethical justification and attendant problems may be somewhat universal.
Lucina Ho provides her reflections under the title "Traditional Confucian Values and Western Legal Frameworks: The Law of Succession. " Ho seeks to measure the Confucian influence on modern succession laws in China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. She seeks proof for the strong thesis that such laws were directly derived from Chinese Confucian sources, finding inconclusive support for it. However, she also measures support for the weak thesis that those who advocated for these laws were influenced by relevant Confucian norms: benevolence, filial piety, reverence, fraternity, and kindness. She then treats us to a fine survey of intestate as well as will-based succession practices in Chinese and selected Western societies. Then, she lists the identifying features of relevant practices in the Chinese societies under investigation:
These features are (a) in all three communities, there are special provisions for needy persons or heirs that might be more far-reaching than those of their Western counterparts; (b) in mainland China, those entitled in the first priority include not just the spouse and children of the deceased, but also his parents; and (c) in mainland China, inheritance (or a greater share of it) may be granted or withheld depending on whether the claimant has furnished maintenance to the deceased. (p. 300) Finally, Ho concludes that, while her weak thesis concerning Confucian influences on modern succession laws can be accepted, a strong thesis alleging that these laws have uniquely Confucian sources cannot.
In "The Confucian Concept of Gender in the Twenty-First Century, " Chan Sin Yee aims to sketch out what the Confucian view of gender would be for Confucian adherents of the yin-yang distinction. She begins by looking at classical sources regarding the yin-yang distinction. She finds therein not only gender essentialism but also complementarity and dynamism. In addition, she finds elements of male superiority of the kind that later had negative effects on male-female relations but says these were tempered by other aspects of early Confucian yin-yang thinking.
Next, she compares the position on gender of liberal feminism with that of Confucian yin-yang thinking. She believes the two positions overlap in some ways but diverge in others. In her view, both views would support equality in politics, the workplace, and the family. However, gender essentialism would be rejected by liberal feminists, as would be laws or social behaviors that disfavor families not based on the male-female, two-parent model. In Chan's view, even these differences could be eliminated by detaching genders from the yin-yang distinction. Indeed, she states, "This is a feasible solution. Recall that in early Confucianism, yin-yang as an explanatory polarity was originally independent from genders" (pp. 332-333).
Actually, there is more to it than this. Chan realizes that, for most of its history, Confucianism embraced yin-yang thinking in which the polarity not only was closely attached to the two genders but was part of a hierarchical vision that considered the male superior to the female. Her claim that this need not be the case is based on an alleged "ambiguity of the basic cosmic hierarchy of yin-yang" (p. 317).
It is ambiguous because "Confucians leave us no clear explanation of what consti-
tutes the superiority of yang over yin" (p. 316). Using this argument, Chan overlooks the most obvious reason for the intransigence-not the dynamic potential for reinterpretation-of Confucian yin-yang thinking. From the moment that Confucians linked the yin-yang polarity to gender they accepted yang/male superiority as an axiom that needed no explanation. The attitude that this superiority is axiomatic is seen, for example, in the opening chapter of the Great Treatise in the Yijing, a foundational text for Confucian cosmology. To create a cosmology lacking this axiom, in which the yin-yang polarity is, moreover, detached from gender, is interesting. But it is hard to imagine that it is, in any meaningful sense, "Confucian. "
Finally, coeditor Hahm Chaibong seeks to enliven our interest with his essay, "Family versus the Individual: The Politics of Marriage Laws in Korea. " Hahm uses a fascinating account of social and legal conflicts that came to a head in 1997, with a Korean Constitutional Court decision, in order to present a view of the Korean family and contrast this with various Western views. Hahm's presentation of these contrasting views is especially persuasive because of his careful survey of the historical developments behind them. In the West, from ancient Greek thinkers through Locke and Rousseau, family relationships were seen as unfit models 70 China Review International: Vol. 15, No. 1, 2008 for life in the public realm. Add to this a tradition of individual rights, and one ends up with a social institution that is a far weaker partner in its relations with the state than is the East Asian family.
To examine the continuing effects of this contrast, Hahm provides details on the Korean version of the East Asian family, beginning with the historical importance of a deep belief in agnatic descent lines and worship of (male) ancestors that was maintained, among other things, by a marriage system that required exogamous unions between different agnatic lineages that were defined by a common surname and an ancestral seat (dongsung-dongbon). Until recently, each Korean person knew the ancestral seat (original home area) that determined his or her subgroup among all the Lees, Kims, or Parks, for example, and none would marry outside that subgroup. With population growth and social mobility, however, more and more couples dared to technically illegal marriages. Finally, in 1995, eight such couples argued that Civil Code 809, which prohibited such unions, violated the constitutional right of each individual to "pursuit of happiness" and "family life, " and in 1997 the Korean Constitutional Court declared the law unconstitutional (p. 337). One would expect that, as a result, new legislation would have been drafted, but instead legislative deadlock ensued. In Hahm's view, this happened because the idea of exogamous agnatic descent lines was so central to Korean family life that challenging it was tantamount to challenging the institution of the family itself. He astutely concludes that all this must be seen as highly symbolic of a society unable to choose between two competing models of the family.
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